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Air Pouch

KAPOK
WSSA-698

Chief, Foreign Branch W

12 October 1948

Tilestone Operation

KAPOK References: Stoc cables 443 and 445.

OPERA

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. An unfortunate, and perhaps unpreventable, situation arose here on 6 October. which may have had adverse effect upon our [] and particularly with reference to the subject operation. It may also cause Swedish pressure to be brought on Baltic groups to eliminate cooperation with Americans. On the evening of 6 October [] and [] were queried by [] as to whether the Americans in Frankfurt were working with some of his people. (See para 7 of our WSSA-690).

2. On the morning of 7 October we were informed that an American officer, in uniform, later positively identified as Rumanus SHUKIS, WOJG, ASN-W2136657, of Constabulary CIC, Germany, had arrived in Stockholm on the previous day. This officer was further reported as being in contact with certain members of Baltic groups in Stockholm, who at that time were under close physical surveillance by the Swedish authorities.

3. Later it was learned that W/O SHUKIS planned to visit the American Embassy commissary to purchase some whiskey at which time he was met by a representative of this office and a brief interview was conducted by [] regarding SHUKIS' activities in Sweden. Brief of the interview as follows:

SHUKIS stated he was on official leave orders, but while on leave in Sweden he was also here for the purpose of establishing contacts with certain Lithuanians. SHUKIS further stated his commanding officer, Captain J.C. BANTA, had not given him specific orders to make such contacts, but on the other hand had encouraged him to "pick-up anything possible of intelligence interest". From the brief conversation with SHUKIS, who is of Lithuanian descent, he claims to have been a personal friend of one [REDACTED], concerning whom we have reported fully, for a period of five years. The initial and previous meetings took place in Germany and as mutual members

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of the wartime Lithuanian underground. While in Sweden SHUKIS is openly living at the apartment of [REDACTED], and has been in contact with at least two other Lithuanians here. During the first day in Sweden he had been observed spending the day at what is referred to as the "headquarters of the Lithuanian Resistance group" in Stockholm. Upon conclusion of the interview he was informed by [REDACTED] to discontinue any intelligence activity and was again reminded of the surveillance by the Swedish authorities.

4. It is clear that these activities will have an adverse effect upon the Swedish IS at this time. This may lead to closer surveillance of our activities by the Swedes and a general distrust for our word and intentions. It is redundant to point out that we will be blamed for a perhaps accidental but nevertheless clumsy operation.

5. In the past we have been aware of our principal Lithuanian source being contacted in Germany, but he has maintained that he has not reported to anyone in that area but was merely keeping up former contacts. At this time we were awaiting receipt of a report which was in the process of being prepared by [REDACTED]. We have further learned that a copy of this report was to have been returned to Germany via SHUKIS, thus further extending the security risk by carrying such a document to Germany from Sweden. In addition to the hazards already pointed out such a situation could easily lead to false confirmation of a report or on the other hand be the basis for considerable distrust and investigation of the source on our part. We have spent considerable effort to keep our contact with certain Lithuanian underground members from the eyes of the Swedish IS and therefore, quite naturally, are most concerned to have that broken by an American officer in uniform.

6. From what is known it would appear [REDACTED] is also guilty of gross error, but in our opinion this has been principally due to the arrival of an American officer, a former friend, and an official army representative.

7. While the exact activities of SHUKIS after departure from our office cannot be assured we feel he may have discontinued his activities in Sweden. However the damage is done and we would appreciate any efforts to prevent a recurrence.

8. While the results of this situation may not be disastrous we wish to point out that any repetition and/or continuation of this contact would lead to serious embarrassment.

9. We suggest that Karlsruhe point out to the interested or responsible authorities that displaced persons or refugees in Sweden are contacted by us in a clandestine fashion, and are also

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contacted by the local officials. We have denied such contacts successfully until the above mentioned incident. It is only natural that the local group would welcome another contact from an official source in the hope of obtaining support for their activities. We do not subsidize these groups and have no direct control over them but have been receiving their reports, etc. To the local authorities there is of course no distinction between the various organizations.

10. Incidentally this matter was informally discussed with the military attaché here who advised that SHUKIS did not register with him upon arrival in Sweden.

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